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This paper starts from the suggestion that there is a deep, historic chasm between the 
disciplines of sociology and psychoanalysis in the United Kingdom. It proposes that we 
might look to the group analytic tradition for a psychosocial clinical practice and body of 
theory that draws on both sociology and psychoanalysis. It introduces the psychosocial and 
relational ideas of S.H.Foulkes, and the move he made beyond the individual/ society 
dualism. The paper suggests that group analysis works with a generative conceptualisation of 
the constitutive permeability and entanglement of being human that is broader than is 
generally understood in psychoanalysis and deeper than is understood in sociology.  
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There is, and long has been, a chasm – a wide space of non-encounter – between the 
disciplines of sociology and psychoanalysis in the United Kingdom. At best, and at their most 
respectful, traditional practitioners and teachers of each bracket off the concerns of the other. 
Matters societal have no legitimate place in the consulting room. When they appear, they are 
to be understood as distractions or defences, detracting from the real business of attending to 
the individual psyche and its maladies. Mirroring this, matters unconscious, and maladies of 
the individual psyche, have no real place within the social scientific sociological problematic. 
They are categorically not the focus of sociology, which exists to probe the structures, 
processes and problems of the social.  
 
At worst, there is profound suspicion, and even hostility, between two disciplines that barely 
publicly recognise the existence of the other. Each represses the challenges posed by the 
other through powerful practices of silencing, while occasionally giving vent to their visceral 
                                                 





distaste for the other: under the cloak of anonymous referees’ comments on papers submitted 
to mainstream journals in which the author is seeking engagement between the fields; in the 
privacy of reports on prospective trainees who might bring with them contaminating ideas 
from outer worlds; and in the safe spaces of the conference and seminar room where 
disciplinary identity formation takes place and disciplinary boundaries are reproduced. (I 
write from experience, as the subject of and a witness to, such acts.) 
 
Yet, this conference on “Sociology and Psychoanalysis” has gathered up a motley crew of 
renegades who have somehow escaped, or are, at least, interested in questioning, our 
disciplinary destinies. We are speaking with each other, and listening to each other, and, 
doing so under the auspices of our respective learned societies, the British Sociological 
Association and the British Psychoanalytic Society. This conference is, therefore, an historic 
moment. In sociology in particular, it marks a real achievement, given the powerful 
objections that existed from senior figures within the discipline to the very formation of the 
Study Group for Sociology, Psychoanalysis and the Psychosocial within the British 
Sociological Association, when the proposal for its establishment was put forward in 2011.  
 
Our coming together for this conference is possible, from the perspective of sociology, 
because of the shifting of the tectonic plates of disciplinary formations that has taken place 
over recent decades. In the wake of the social movements of the ’60s and ’70s, sociology has 
been challenged to its core by the development of critical interdisciplinary spaces:  women’s, 
gender and sexuality studies; cultural studies; post-colonial; and critical race studies. In these 
new fields, traditional social scientific concern with social divisions and inequality has come 
into dialogue with profoundly affective questions of identity, subjectivity and personal 
experience, and their pains and troubles. Through this substantive and conceptual challenge, 
the foundational dualisms on which sociology has been built have been opened up to 
scrutiny:  individual/ societal, reason/ emotion, personal/ political, psychological/ 
sociological. As these new interdisciplines reshaped the intellectual landscape, they created 
the conditions of possibility for the emergence of another new interdisciplinary field: 
psychosocial studies. 
 
Psychosocial studies is, as I see it, an explicit project to undo the 19
th
 century distinction 
between psychology and sociology, and to focus on the exploration of the complex 
entanglement of psychic and social, of inner and outer worlds. It does this through its 
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distinctive mobilisation of the notion of ‘the psychosocial’. Yet not all of those attracted to 
the project of psychosocial studies are sympathetic to psychoanalysis – and many who are 
remain, at heart, firmly located at the ‘psycho’ end of the spectrum, not able or willing to 
really embrace the scope of the challenge that taking the social seriously in all its 
instantiations would entail.  
 
Because it is difficult to really work with the complexity of the totality of human experience 
– and with its fissures, fractures, and fragments – it is difficult to hold together multiple levels 
of human experience: individual and collective, the intensely personal, the interpersonal and 
intersubjective, the familial and small group, the peer group and the communal, the local, the 
regional, the national, the global; and the interactions, intersections, contradictions, tensions 
and conflicts between them. It is difficult to allow the plurality, the multiplicity, the 
messiness of thinking beyond metaphors of structure that stabilise and solidify the processual 
and the relational. It is difficult not to bracket off that which eludes our established 
disciplinary conceptualisations, to allow ourselves to admit to not knowing quite how to 
grasp the slippery, the fleeting, the momentary, the traces, the echoes, the multidimensional. 
It is so much easier to focus on what our established conceptual languages enable us to see 
and to hear, and to convince ourselves that this is what really matters. 
 
Yet there is a practice and a body of theory that has long been working in this almost 
impossible, uncharted, and rather dangerous terrain of the psychosocial. Group analysis is a 
clinical practice rooted in, and productive of, thinking that self-consciously understands itself 
as emanating from both psychoanalysis and sociology. If to those of us of a psychosocial 
persuasion, neither sociology nor psychoanalysis has, thus far, been able to attend adequately 
and simultaneously to both the ‘depth’ of unconscious human experience and the ‘breadth’ of 
human sociality in its complex, diverse, historically specific instantiations, then, I want to 
suggest that group analysis offers an altogether more promising topography – one that is 
better able to understand and work transformatively with the complex constitutive 
relationality of human life and its many vicissitudes. 
 
But what is group analysis, and how does it do this?  
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The person to whom the founding of group analysis is attributed is S.H. Foulkes (1898-
1976).
2
 Michael Foulkes, as he became, as a refugee in England, was a German-Jewish medic 
and psychiatrist who trained in neurology with Kurt Goldstein, and then as a psychoanalyst in 
Vienna with Helene Deutsch.
3
 In the early 1930s, as Director of the clinic of the Institute of 
Psychoanalysis in Frankfurt, he worked in the same building that housed the Institute for 
Social Research, the place to which many of us who are seeking a rapprochement between 
sociology and psychoanalysis return again and again in our minds and our reading. Leaving 
Germany in 1933 for London, he continued his practice as a psychoanalyst, became a training 
psychoanalyst, and in 1939 moved to Exeter in south-west England, where he conducted his 
first analytic groups, bringing individual patients together in groups for therapy.  
 
During the second world war, Foulkes worked as a psychiatrist at the Northfield military 
hospital, where first Wilfred Bion and John Rickman, and then he, developed ways of 
working traumatised soldiers in groups, out of which the therapeutic community model 
developed.
4
 After the war, working analytically with groups of patients became his preferred 
form of practice, and he started writing about it soon afterwards. It was from these 
experiments that group analysis as a distinctive modality of psychoanalytic therapy 
developed. In 1951, Foulkes and others formed the Group Analytic Society to develop the 
field, with refugee sociologist Norbert Elias a founding member. 
 
In his first major work on group analysis, Introduction to Group Analytic Psychotherapy 
(1948), Foulkes presented his Goldstein-influenced ontology of holism: ‘Life is a complex 
whole. It can only artificially be separated into parts, analysed’ (p. 1). He proposed a radical 
critique of what he called the ‘isolating scientific method’ that came to dominate in the 19
th
 
century, arguing that psychoanalysis had begun the work of acknowledging the importance of 
the ‘total situation’ of any individual patient (p. 7) and of investigating how ‘the present 
personality and the present situation, even in their totality, are inseparable from the past – that 
of the individual and the race – and the future’ (p. 9). 
 
                                                 
2
 There is growing recognition in group analysis globally of the pioneering work of American psychoanalyst 
Trigant Burrow (1875-1950) and his influence on Foulkes. See Pertegato and Pertegato (2013). 
3
 Kurt Goldstein, as both a neurologist and psychiatrist, is known for his holistic approach to human life and for 
coining the term ‘self-actualization’, and influenced greatly the emergence of Gestalt psychotherapy. See 
Goldstein (1955, original 1934). 
4
 See Harrison and Clarke (1992), Harrison (2000), and Mills and Harrison (2007). 
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Foulkes credited Freud with showing that ‘the “outer” world becomes internalised, that man’s 
inner dynamic world is a microcosmic reflection of the whole world, at least his whole world’ 
(p. 10). But he started to develop a critique of psychoanalysis for failing to have ‘allotted to 
this social side of man the same basic importance as it has his instinctual aspect’ (p. 10). He 
went on to argue that it is wrong to understand ‘the “world” and “society” or even the family’ 
in terms of ‘“individual” interactions’: 
It is the same mistake, as it was, to consider the whole as the sum of its parts. From a 
mature, scientific point of view, the opposite is true: each individual – itself an artificial, 
though plausible, abstraction – is basically and centrally determined, inevitably, by the 
world in which he lives, by the community, the group, of which he forms a part. Progress 
in all the sciences during the last decades has led to the same independent and concerted 
conclusion; that the old juxtaposition of an inside and outside world, constitution and 
environment, individual and society, phantasy and reality, body and mind and so on, are 
untenable. They can at no stage be separated from each other, except by artificial 
isolation. (p. 10)  
In this passage we can see Foulkes’ sociological problem and his reaching for a psychosocial 
solution. He begins with a classic Durkheimian position, the fundamental tenet and 
foundational claim of sociology as a discipline: that society is not reducible to the individuals 
of which it is made up, that it has a reality sui generis. In this, he is articulating a social 
determinism: the individual is ‘basically and centrally determined’ (p.10) by the group.  
 
Now this is a radical and deeply challenging statement in the context of psychoanalysis, but 
to a contemporary sociologist it is likely to immediately raise the problem of agency: how, if 
we are all entirely socially determined, does change ever take place?
5
 What are the sources of 
creativity, innovation, transformation? Moreover, wherein lies the singularity of lived 
experience? 
 
But Foulkes immediately undercuts this position with the psychosocial claim that ‘inside and 
outside world, constitution and environment, individual and society, phantasy and reality, 
body and mind and so on’ cannot actually be separated from each other. He posits, in the 
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 Sociology was subject to trenchant, and influential, critique by Wrong for its attachment to an ‘oversocialised’ 
conception of personhood and an ‘overintegrated’ view of society. Wrong suggested that psychoanalysis offered 
a less deterministic view of ‘man’ (sic) than sociology. Highly unusually, he published papers making much the 
same argument, but aimed at different audiences, in both The American Sociological Review (1961) and in 
Psychoanalytic Review (1962).  
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language of Goldstein’s neurology, an understanding of the individual as ‘part of a social 
network, a little nodal point’ (p. 14). He challenges psychoanalysis to take seriously ‘the 
patient’s total life situation’, rather than seeing ‘“life” and “reality” merely as projection, 
screen and reflector of his “unconscious phantasies”’. They are, he says, both ‘at the same 
time. The truth is, that the two can never be separated’ (p. 15).  
 
In Foulkes’ later writings, this emergent psychosocial ontology is re-articulated as essential to 
group analysis. In 1966, in Some Basic Concepts in Group Psychotherapy, he set out the 
claim that group analysis is developing: 
a method and theory that would do away with such pseudo-problems as biological 
versus cultural, somatogenic versus psychogenic, individual versus group and reality 
versus phantasy. Instead we must endeavour to use concepts which from the 
beginning do justice to an integrated view” (p. 155).  
In 1973, in ‘The group as matrix of the individual's mental life’, he argued:  
As group analysts we do not share the psychoanalytic juxtaposition of an “internal” 
psychological reality and an “external” physical or social reality which, for 
psychoanalysis, makes good sense. What is inside is outside, the “social” is not 
external but very much internal too and penetrates the innermost being of the 
individual personality. (pp. 226–7) 
And in 1974, in ‘My philosophy in psychotherapy’, in the context of expounding his 
philosophy of mind, he said, ‘we cannot make the conventional sharp differentiation between 
inside and outside, or between phantasy and reality. What is inside is always also outside, 
what is outside is inside as well (p. 278). 
  
So, Foulkes was proposing a new, transgressively psychosocial mode of thinking that drew 
on both psychoanalysis and sociology, and that was seeking to move beyond the individual/ 
society dichotomy, many years before the emergence of psychosocial studies. And this mode 
of thinking was fundamentally relational in orientation (Roseneil, 2013). 
 
Group analysis starts from the premise that people are group animals, always already formed 
by the groups of which we are members, and that sociality is fundamental and originary: the 
individual, and the supposedly individual unconscious, are always already social. Our 
subjectivity is multiple, group-ish, the product of the introjections and projections not just of 
individual care-givers, but of much wider networks of relations, personal and impersonal. 
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Group analysis places great emphasis on culture lived through both biographical and 
generational time. It attends to the customs, traditions, norms and places that form us and that 
we carry with us, and that we make and remake in our everyday lives, and in the analytic 
group itself, recognising that much of this remains outside our consciousness (hence the core 
group analytic concept of the social unconscious).
6
 Group analysis stresses collective 
inheritance, which is much wider than familial intergenerational transmission. It is concerned, 
as a matter of course, with issues of national and ethnic and racial belonging, and with the 
traumas and losses resultant on war and conflict, about which people are often unable to 
speak, and which elude conscious awareness, causing much psychic distress and relational 
disturbance.  
 
This means that in group analysis laterality becomes as much a focus as the horizontality of 
parent-child relationships: the formative importance of sibling, friendship and peer group 
relationships, and the ongoing centrality of these in adult life, and within the group itself, are 
the explicit object of analysis. And in this questions of power – of inequality, difference, 
competition, envy and shame – take their place as central to understanding emotional life, and 
its trials and tribulations. Noticing, and grappling with, practices of domination and 
subordination based on class, gender, race, sexuality – and their lived realities within and 
without the group is the everyday business of group analysis – or it should be: practice does 
not always live up to its radical psychosocial promise.  
 
Where psychoanalysis places two individuals in a room together and focuses on their 
relationship (which it might then, in some approaches, conceptualise as triadic) – attending 
with a particular affective and theoretical intensity to the internalisations and transferences of 
dyadic relations, and taking largely for granted the power relations between analyst and 
analysand, mother and child – group analysis places up to eight people in a room together, 
with the group analyst, who is also understood as a member of the group, albeit with the very 
particular role of ‘conductor’. The work of the group is to explore all manner of relationships 
that emerge within the space of the group, between its members. This enables an analytic 
focus on the multiplicity and complexity of the internalisations and transferences that exist 
beyond the narrow confines of the historically and culturally specific, patriarchal, procreative, 
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 See, for example, Hopper (2003) and Hopper and Weinberg (2011). 
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heterosexual nuclear family form on which psychoanalysis is based, and which less and less 
maps on to the lived realities of contemporary intimate life.  
 
All this is done through the collective yet intensely personal exploration of the variety of 
embodied multi-sensory modes of communication between group members, who are seated 
facing each other in a circle. With the guidance of the conductor – more explicit at the 
beginning, less so as the group’s culture develops – the group attends to the ebb and flow of 
the exchange between its members, to the blockages in meaning and understanding, to the 
silences and differential taking up of time and space, and to the free associations as topics 
change. The group learns to read languages of mind and body by noting the particularities of 
those of each member, and how they shift and change over time, identifying practices of 
mirroring, and feeling the affective power of the resonance of experience between members.. 
Over time, group members ideally might develop an appreciation that we are each bounded 
and singular in our individual bodies, and yet also fundamentally permeable of mind and 
body, living always entangled with each other in ways that are broader and deeper than we 
ultimately can ever fully grasp. So it is that group analysis works with a conceptualisation of 
the constitutive permeability and entanglement of being human that is broader than is 
generally understood in psychoanalysis and deeper than is understood in sociology.  
 
I end by returning to the metaphor with which I began: that of the chasm that seems to exist 
between conventional modes of sociology and psychoanalysis. I suggest that from the 
perspective of group analysis, this chasm might more productively be regarded as a crack in 
the disciplinary ground on which we walk - less impossible to breach, and indeed containing 
generative possibilities. As the late, great Leonard Cohen reminds us:  
  There is a crack in everything 
  That’s how the light gets in. (‘Anthem’) 
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